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If you don't like Europe as it is: improve it!  
José Manuel Barrosso  
State of the Union Address 2013 
 
 
THE CRISIS AND THE EU CRITICS 
The EU is in the most serious crisis since its beginnings in the 1950’s. Never before has 
there existed a realistic risk of implosion: a collapse from inside, at the least a significant and 
serious decline of cooperation, cohesiveness and common action, a loss of ambition, possibly 
ending with no more than a loose free trade area. It is time to remember what the European 
Union stands for, and it is time to take to heart what Abraham Lincoln said in 1858, some years 
before the beginning of the American Civil War: A House divided against itself cannot stand.  
There is extensive criticism of the EU. A majority of the British have decided to leave the 
Union. A new nationalism is growing in Europe, for different reasons but to no small measure 
feeding on a wide-spread EU-critical sentiment. And as if that were not enough: At the same 
time new threats have emerged, within the EU and on the outside.  
Criticism comes mainly from two different groups. 
First, there are those who recognize the shortcomings of the Union but continue to be 
deeply convinced of its value. They want reform not dissolution. However, these critics follow 
two different approaches. A not insignificant number sees the solution in ‘more Europe’, i.e. in 
bolder integration steps (they are to be found mainly in Brussels), while the other cluster sees 
the answer in some limitation of central powers and a more pronounced role for member states. 
In contrast, the opposition of the other large group of critics is fundamental. They reject 
the EU as such. Those on the left in this group have essentially different political, economic and 
social concepts while those on the right emphasise what they consider to be a sacrifice of 
national identity and control. This fundamental hostility to the European Union on the left and 
right (both supported by Putin) has grown and become more outspoken.  
The current mood is thus not favourable to ‘ever closer union’. 
The nation-state offers identity and seeming control which distant Brussels does not. If 
something needs to be changed, ordinary citizens see it happening in their immediate 
environment, and if they hope to have any influence at all, it is in this environment. “I want my 
country back” is a feeling that is found not only in Britain.  
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The American phenomenon of the forgotten ‘frustrated poor white man’ is discernible 
also in Europe: a combination of personal resentment, the feeling of being left behind and not 
heard, opposition to globalization (CETA, TTIP), anti-Americanism and repudiation of our 
institutions, political elites and the need for compromise. These people, often indifferent in the 
past, are now turning to those parties that openly express this frustration and blame current 
political elites, at home and in the EU.  As many studies have shown: socio-political frustration 
and nationalism often go hand in hand.  
Thus, we face two challenges. We need to reform the EU and put it back on the path to 
success. At the same time we must confront the basic questioning of our democratic way of 
doing things: of accepting diversity, the search for compromise and decision by majority.  
THE BENEFITS OF THE EU 
Often taken for granted, we need to remind ourselves of the many benefits that accrue 
to us from cooperation and unity in Europe. More on our minds today seems to be what is wrong 
with the European Union. True, the Union is not managing critical issues effectively: but that is 
reason to improve, not to abandon or deconstruct it.  
When we talk about the benefits peace is usually mentioned first. We have overcome 
ingrained, often century-old, animosity between our countries. This is the historic achievement. 
It is today taken as a matter of course. But it is not self-sustaining. It needs to be nourished and 
cared for. 
One way of ensuring this is by keeping in mind what has been achieved and serves us 
well. The European project has brought us a singular, in fact revolutionary structure for peaceful 
conflict resolution. This is the essential foundation on which all else rests. However complex 
and at times dysfunctional the institutions in Brussels may be, they ensure contact, discussion, 
compromise and thus peace and progress.  
We see each other and we talk to each other on a daily and equal basis. Among so many 
states with so many different interests and ways of doing things – would anybody expect this 
not to be complex? To be easy, simple and always transparent? We have differences, conflicts, 
crises – but we have the instruments and means, that we have built up over the years, from 
Rome to Lisbon, to find compromises and to move together to guard that specifically European 
mixture of democracy, freedom, diversity, social justice and welfare.  
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Yes, this does not always come about effectively and often not efficiently. Most of the 
time it is circuitous and long-winded. The results are sometimes uneven. They do not satisfy 
everybody. But we have nothing better. I claim that it is this structure – today so often criticised 
and even scorned – that is the decisive achievement of European integration! It is this structure 
that ensures cooperation and peace within our community. It ensures our ability to stand 
together in facing internal threats as well as political, economic and military challenges that 
come from the outside, challenges and tasks that no state can meet alone.  
CITIZEN SUPPORT 
But are European citizens fully aware of this? The support of our citizens is essential to 
maintain and develop the Union. Why do we seem to be losing this support (not only in England 
and Wales)? Let me suggest some reasons. 
First of all, except for the early 1950’s, the European integration process was never an 
issue that elicited strong emotional support in the general public. It was an elite project and it 
had the support of the public – or was simply neglected by the public – as long as it did not 
create problems and went along with economic progress. This is valid also for all of the 
extensions of the Union, including the eastern expansion of 2004: it was not cooperation or 
unity but the expectation of economic gain that stood on the forefront.  
In the past integration and economic advance went hand in hand. That is different now.  
The economy is stalling. We are no longer integrating only benefits but are confronted with the 
need to integrate problems – such as monetary union, mass migration and terrorist threats. 
These are the issues that make headlines, and they touch on the daily lives of citizens. The 
Union is faced with greater demands and expectations. In short: more problems, fewer benefits.  
As Goethe said, nothing is more difficult to bear than a series of good days. We have 
experienced a series of good years, dangerously enhanced by the availability of cheap money, 
and large groups of our citizens do not understand why this should come to an end. The truth 
is that we need reform. More money alone will not do the trick.  
THE EU AND THE NATION STATE  
What can we do? Let me look at a number of suggestions. 
To enhance national influence and make it more visible, the idea of giving the national 
parliaments a greater say in decisions that are currently made in Brussels has been revived. But 
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apart from the voice member states already have through their governments, democratically 
elected, and the European Parliament, democratically elected, I have not come across a specific 
proposal on how this can be done without seriously disrupting EU policy-making capability.  
We are just witnessing this in the case of CETA. Remember: we already find the decision-
making processes complex and too slow! 
Of course, the idea is not new. To increase the influence of national parliaments, to 
ensure subsidiarity and to encourage a more widespread discussion of issues in the member 
states a number of measures were foreseen in the Protocol on Subsidiarity and Proportionality, 
attached to the Lisbon Treaty, as well as in several articles in the Treaty itself. The idea was that 
national parliaments could intervene whenever they thought that the EU was infringing on the 
rule of subsidiarity. For logistical and political reasons they have rarely been used. These 
measures may have looked promising on paper, but they have not stood the test of reality. 
Is there an alternative? 
A way out of the dilemma could be a renewed effort to define – and limit – more clearly 
and concretely the competences that accrue to the European Union. Everything not clearly 
specified as Union powers, would remain in the national remit. Beyond that, areas of 
cooperation could be defined in which Brussels would act primarily as a facilitator for common 
policy and action. 
Of course, I am entirely aware that this is difficult. But it is not impossible. Let’s not give 
up before we’ve tried. To quote Seneca: We are not trying because it is difficult, but it is difficult 
because we are not trying!  
Above all, it is the only genuine reform that would make a real difference. On the one 
hand it would be ‘more Europe’ by ensuring closely knit ties in certain areas. On the other hand, 
it would be ‘less Europe’ by leaving prime responsibility in all other areas with the national states. 
Responsibility would become more transparent and clearly attributable. Subsidiarity would 
become real. 
Of course, once you have assigned competences, you must stick to them. You cannot, 
when the going gets rough, casually re-assign them, as has just happened with CETA. If 
somebody had predicted this scenario five years ago, you would have taken him aside and 
calmly explained how the European Union works.  
What Europe needs is a renewed comprehension of our deep and lasting 
interdependence. The awareness of this has faded in the past years. Delineating competences, 
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on the one hand, and areas of cooperation, on the other, would represent a start in reversing the 
trend. It would be a reminder and a wake-up call for national political leaders in Europe. 
OVER-REGULATION 
Another area for reform is the much criticised over-regulation by the Commission. The 
Commission, regularly supported by rulings of the European Court of Justice, has continually 
extended its powers. Under the heading of completing the internal market, the responsible 
directorates of the Commission have gone over-board in detailing what member states or their 
citizens may or may not do.   
The situation is made worse because member states or various interest groups use the 
EU to achieve rulings that are unpopular at home – and then allow ‘Brussels’ to be blamed.  
Yes, many of the regulations may be justified from the internal market point of view. But 
concern about olive oil jugs in restaurants or high heels for hairdressers on the EU level does 
seem a bit ridiculous.  Also, citizens find it difficult to understand why, on the one hand, the EU 
is telling them what light bulbs to use or how much power their vacuum cleaners may have but, 
on the other, is not capable of developing a common energy policy to ensure that there will be 
power for the light bulbs and vacuum cleaners.  
Here, too, it is necessary to make the term ‘subsidiarity’ tangible and to make it clear 
that the EU is there to deal with the big issues, the issues that no state can deal with alone. As 
Commission President Barroso recognized in his State of the Union Address already in 2013: 
“Not everything needs a solution at European level. Europe must focus on where it can add 
most value. Where this is not the case, it should not meddle. The EU needs to be big on big 
things and smaller on smaller things - something we may occasionally have neglected in the 
past.”  
We must resolve the paradox that the EU seems to regulate everything but gets nothing 
done. 
INTERNAL SECURITY AND MIGRATION  
In the field of internal security we have begun to understand that cooperation between 
police, intelligence services and administrations is a critical requirement.  
Every incident highlights our shortcomings and after every incident we talk about these 
issues. But before the Charlie Hebdo incident only four member states were actually sharing 
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information on terrorist suspects. This is changing. Every incident pushes us a bit further on 
the road to closer collaboration. The EU is establishing various agencies to improve the state 
of affairs. But progress is far too slow. It is hampered by national egotism, bureaucracy, political 
failure, incompetence and above all short-sightedness. We are short on long-term thinking. As 
in many other cases, this too depends on the member states more than on Brussels.  
Since the summer of 2015 migration has become increasingly connected to internal 
security. We know that some of the terrorists came in with the refugee flow. That has led to 
suspicion and discrimination against migrants in general, making the task of integration more 
difficult.  
But for many of our member states and their citizens there are two further questions 
that cause anxiety. Citizens are concerned, first, about the possible long-run difficulties of 
integrating new minorities from very different cultural and religious backgrounds and then, 
second, about the effects on the identity and homogeneity of their societies. Why, they ask, 
should they be requested (or even forced by majority vote) to import, as they see it, potentially 
unforeseeable problems? Are they really to be blamed? How do we combine the concerns of 
these member states with the demand to find a common European solution? It is likely that the 
EU will have to give more room to its member states in these questions.  
These are highly sensitive issues. But we cannot afford to allow political correctness to 
hamper a frank discussion. The functioning of a democratic society depends on argument and 
the presentation of alternatives. Concerns are not automatically unjustified, arguments not 
necessarily invalid just because they come from the ‘wrong side’. On the contrary, it is 
dangerous to leave the articulation of such anxieties to radical forces on the left or the right. We 
must react to concerns where applicable and refute arguments where they are wrong.  
Migration and the security of external borders are obviously related to Schengen. If 
external borders are not secure anybody who crosses them can move about freely and 
uncontrolled in the entire Schengen area. 
Schengen was concluded in a somewhat romantic and optimistic mood. The security 
of external borders did not seem an issue at the time since the influx was limited and 
manageable. The same is true for the first Dublin agreement at the beginning of the 1990’s. 
Nobody had the imagination to consider that simply the numbers might change. And numbers 
make a difference. We are now talking about millions of people.  
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No sovereign state will be willing to relinquish the right to decide on who should enter 
the country. If the EU underestimates the importance of this, it will lose the support of its 
citizens and contribute to the growth of extremist movements.  
The issues must be discussed and the EU must present better arguments as well as 
better results. After all, the migration issue did not come entirely by surprise. Already in 2013 
the President of the Commission pointed to the need to establish a common asylum policy, to 
strengthen the protection of external borders and to combat irregular migration.  
The Common European Asylum System (CEAS) and the various information exchange 
procedures are a start but not enough. The next step will have to be the development of a 
common European immigration policy. Such a policy could differentiate between valid asylum 
seekers, refugees and migrants. In this way one could oblige all EU member states to accept 
the first category, also the second on a quota system, but would allow for differences on the 
third group.  
ECONOMIC REFORM 
Next to internal security and migration the economy is the third major challenge facing 
the EU. As I have already indicated, to a critical degree the success of the European integration 
process depends on the economy. This does not refer to some overall European economy but 
to the national economy of each member state. If the parts do not function, the whole will not 
function. If the economic infrastructure is not in order the political superstructure will not 
function. 
The truth is that we need fundamental structural reform in most countries. This means 
adjustment, also painful adjustment. The euro countries – thanks to monetary union – can no 
longer increase their competitiveness by adjusting exchange rates.  
When EMU was set up, it was assumed that with the set rules these countries would 
adjust their economies accordingly. But they found they had an alternative: cheap money. Now, 
after this is failing or not producing the desired results, they can only hope to become more 
competitive by lowering their costs – and that means lowering wages (and in view of the large 
state debts also pensions and social services).  
And that is exactly the problem. That is why it is hurting the weakest members of our 
societies, leading to more disenchantment with the EU, considered to be responsible, and the 
growth of Euro- or EU-critical parties. 
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When tough adjustments are required popular resistance comes readily. In many cases, 
even when governments recognize the need for change, they show themselves as either too 
weak or too opportunistic to make an attempt to convince their electorate. 
What is worse is that the current policy of the European Central Bank of providing billions 
of euros of ‘cheap money’ is decreasing the pressure for reform. ‘Whatever it takes’, is the word, 
and it is taking a lot (currently some 80 billion euros a month, over the past two years almost 2 
trillion – a 2 with 12 zeros!). If an engine is broken, there is no use in pouring more petrol into it. 
But that is exactly what the ECB is doing. The flow of money is helping weak economies to 
survive by the skin of their teeth and to continue avoiding the necessary reform that would lead 
to recovery and sustainable growth.  
If you think this judgement is harsh, ask yourself what success the ECB’s policy has had 
so far. None. It has neither raised the inflation rate nor has it increased investment or stimulated 
growth in the weaker economies.  
It is a vain hope that somebody will invest in the faltering and uncompetitive economies. 
Investors do not invest because money is cheap; they invest because they expect profits. And 
profits in these economies cannot be expected unless structural reforms are implemented; not 
just decided upon but implemented. 
True, this past year we have experienced some modest economic growth – but not 
surprisingly primarily in those countries that have implemented some reforms rather than in 
those that have not. 
The EU has now proposed a massive investment programme. This is good, but such 
investment must be sustainable and support structural reforms. If it is used only to meet short-
term dissatisfaction, it will remain, as I understand the French say, ‘bling bling’ investment, or in 
the German term, a straw fire that flares up briefly and collapses quickly.   
The irony of the issue is that the policy of low interest rates is also reallocating wealth 
from the poor to the rich by decreasing the value of savings and increasing the value of stocks 
and property. And a final negative effect: The citizens in the weaker states feel lectured to and 
among others blame the EU while the citizens in the stronger states feel exploited. Rather than 
further uniting the Europeans the fact is that monetary union as handled thus far has divided 
them. 
Meanwhile EMU has become ‘sanctified’. The euro is equated with the success of the 
European Union: “Scheitert der Euro, scheitert Europa“ – if the euro fails, Europe will fail. A 
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doubly incorrect statement: if a state left the euro-zone, the euro would not fail, and even if the 
euro failed, it would not be the end of the European Union. While all finance ministers at one 
point favoured a temporary ‘Grexit’ in order to allow Greece to recover, the heads of government 
ruled out this option for political reasons. But if it does not work economically, it won’t work 
politically. 
Do we need more responsibility on the part of political leaders or do we need more 
insight on the part of the people? The answer for both is long-term thinking which Max Weber 
considered a basis for economic success. If voters expect quick results and politicians see only 
the next election, history’s judgement will not be kind.  
ADHERENCE TO THE RULES  
Allow me to raise a final point: adherence to the rules. EMU lumped together a number 
of incompatible economies. Those were political, not economic decisions.  If it could work at all, 
it could only work if the rules set up were adhered to. After all, that is why these rules were 
made: to make something work that by all economic standards and recognized historical 
experience could not work. Rules to prevent excessive spending and indebtedness were 
indispensable.  
Instead, it has become customary to bend rules or not to adhere to them at all – we now 
call it ‘flexibilisation’. Moreover, where the Commission claims to be enforcing them, it does so 
in a discriminatory manner: against some members but not against others, against the weak 
but not against the strong.  
I recall the Commission President’s answer to the question why France was not being 
held to meeting its obligations: Because it’s France, he said. The effect on respect for the EU is 
disastrous. It undermines both mutual confidence and trust in the EU. To take an analogy: The 
CEO of an airline announces that the safety regulations for small aircraft will be strictly 
enforced. But there will be tolerance for the larger passenger aircraft since they are big and 
important companies produce them! How much confidence would you have in such an airline? 
We must return to the rule of law. The rule of law is a basic principle of our political 
system. Member states must abide by the rules that they have set up. If Brussels does not insist 
on this, it undermines its policies and loses respect and legitimacy. 
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FOREIGN POLICY  
Foreign and security policy is an area for which – while recognizing the benefits of 
cooperation – the member states have set narrow limits for the Union. Within these limits the 
EU is active in foreign and security policy. The High Representative had a central role as a 
facilitator in achieving the nuclear agreement with Iran. The EU is active in several crisis areas 
in Africa and in the Mediterranean. It is building up Frontex. It is cooperating with NATO in 
developing concepts to meet hybrid warfare threats, a crucial issue where the EU can make a 
significant contribution.  
There is now talk of increased defense cooperation, even a European Army. How we 
would manage that in view of our difficulties with monetary union and now even trade, escapes 
me. Before we launch new ideas we might go ahead and implement those things that we have 
promised so far: real cooperation in production and procurement of defense material and 
permanent structured cooperation. In this field we have enough to do before launching 
ambitious new plans. 
Of course, there are shortcomings and possibilities for improvement. State and nation 
building – particularly the latter – is a key to crisis prevention and post-crisis stabilization. 
Development aid – of which the Europeans are internationally the largest donors – has not been 
particularly successful. In both areas new ideas are urgently needed. The United States for once 
is not on the intellectual forefront in these areas. Why don’t we Europeans present new and 
promising concepts? We tend to talk mainly about hardware. But influence derives also from 
good ideas to solve key problems. 
Yes, we would like to see a more active, more influential and more effective international 
role for the European Union. But the ‘single voice’ in European foreign policy by 
institutionalization and majority voting is not in the offing very soon. Nonetheless, the 
Europeans can achieve more by closer and effective cooperation. That requires a clearer 
definition of concrete targets for specific issues, a broader exchange of information and the 
distinct will to achieve common positions. It is alright to speak with more than one voice, but 
we need to say the same thing. That would be common enough.   
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CONCLUSIONS  
What are my conclusions? 
First, there is no sense in pretending that this is just another EU crisis, and in the end we 
will all be stronger for it. We are at a crossroads, and our future depends on whether we make 
the right turn.  
Second, we need to be clear that we are confronted by two different but related threats, 
a threat to the EU and a threat to all that the EU stands for. Both challenges must be met. 
Third, we need an open and frank discussion on four points: 
- why do we need the European Union, 
- what shape is the EU to take, 
- what can we expect the Union to deliver, 
- and what changes does this require? 
Such a discussion must be launched in Brussels and in all capitals. It must be conducted 
without fear of possible treaty changes.  
The EU is no longer an elite project known only to a few. We must gain and assure the 
support by the European citizens. Without this support we cannot achieve anything.  
Many a Master’s thesis that I received in the course of the years ended with the 
conclusion: It all depends on political will. How right they were.  
It is our task to foster insight and develop the will for reform and the determination to 
cooperate. A House divided against itself cannot stand. We must not allow the European Union 
to go into history as no more than a great experiment.  
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Europe is in a constant state of flux. European politics, economics, law and indeed 
European societies are changing rapidly. The European Union itself is in a continuous situation 
of adaptation. New challenges and new requirements arise continually, both internally and 
externally.  
The College of Europe Studies series seeks to publish research on these issues done at 
the College of Europe, both at its Bruges and its Natolin (Warsaw) campus. Focused on the 
European Union and the European integration process, this research may be specialised in the 
areas of political science, law or economics, but much of it is of an interdisciplinary nature. The 
objective is to promote understanding of the issues concerned and to make a contribution to 
ongoing discussions. 
 
L’Europe subit des mutations permanentes. La vie politique, l’économie, le droit, mais 
également les sociétés européennes, changent rapidement. L’Union européenne s’inscrit dès 
lors dans un processus d’adaptation constant. Des défis et des nouvelles demandes 
surviennent sans cesse, provenant à la fois de l’intérieur et de l’extérieur. 
La collection des Cahiers du Collège d’Europe publie les résultats des recherches menées 
sur ces thèmes au Collège d’Europe, au sein de ses deux campus (Bruges et Varsovie). 
Focalisés sur l’Union européenne et le processus d’intégration, ces travaux peuvent être 
spécialisés dans les domaines des sciences politiques, du droit ou de l’économie, mais ils sont 
le plus souvent de nature interdisciplinaire. La collection vise à approfondir la compréhension 
de ces questions complexes et contribue ainsi au débat européen. 
 
 
24 
 
Series Titles: 
 
vol. 18 Schunz, Simon, European Union Foreign Policy and the Global Climate Regime, 2014 
(371 p.), ISBN 978-2-87574-134-9 pb, 978-3-0352-6409-8 (eBook) 
vol. 17 Govaere, Inge / Hanf, Dominik (eds.), Scrutinizing Internal and External Dimensions of 
European Law volumes I and II, 2013 (880 p.), ISBN 978-2-87574-085-4 pb, ISBN 978-3-0352-
6342-8 (eBook)  
vol. 16 Chang, Michele / Monar, Jӧrg (eds.), The European Commission in the Post-Lisbon Era of 
Crises: Between Political Leadership and Policy Management, 2013 (298 p.), ISBN 978-2-87574-
028-1 pb, ISBN 978-3-0352-6294-0 (eBook) 
vol. 15 Mahnke, Dieter / Gstӧhl, Sieglinde (eds.), European Union Diplomacy: Coherence, Unity and 
Effectiveness, 2012 (273 p.) ISBN 978-90-5201-842-3 pb, ISBN 978-3-0352-6172-1 (eBook) 
vol. 14 Lannon, Erwan (ed.), The European Neighborhood Policy’s Challenges, 2012 (491p.), ISBN 
978-90-5201-779-2 pb, ISBN 978-3-0352-6104-2 (eBook) 
vol. 13 Cremona, Marise / Monar, Jörg / Poli Sara (eds.), The External Dimension of the European 
Union’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, 2011 (432 p.), ISBN 978-90-5201-728-0 pb, ISBN 
978-3-0352-6107-3 (eBook) 
vol. 12 Men, Jong / Balducci, Giuseppe (eds.), Prospects and Challenges for EU-China Relations in 
the 21st Century, 2010 (262 p.), ISBN 978-90-5201-641-2 pb. 
vol. 11 Monar, Jörg (ed.), The Institutional Dimension of the European Union’s Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice, 2010 (268 p.), ISBN 978-90-5201-615-3 pb. 
vol. 10 Hanf, Dominik / Malacek, Klaus / Muir, elise (eds.), Langues et construction européenne, 
2010 (286 p.), ISBN 978-90-5201-594-1 pb. 
vol. 9 Pelkmans, Jacques / Hanf, Dominik / Chang, Michele (eds.), The EU Internal Market in 
Comparative Perspective, 2008 (314 p.), ISBN 978-90-5201-424-1 pb. 
vol. 8 Govaere, Inge / Ullrich, Hanns (eds.), Intellectual Property, Market Power and the Public 
Interest, 2008 (315 p.), ISBN 978-90-5201-422-7 pb. 
vol. 7 Inotai, András, The European Union and Southeastern Europe: Troubled Waters Ahead?, 2007 
(414 p.), ISBN 978-90-5201-071-7 pb. 
vol. 6 Govaere, Inge / Ullrich, Hanns (eds.), Intellectual Property, Public Policy, and International 
Trade, 2007 (232 p.), ISBN 978-90-5201-064-9 pb. 
vol. 5 Hanf, Dominik / Muñoz, Rodolphe (eds.), La libre circulation des personnes: États des lieux 
et perspectives, 2007 (329 p.), ISBN 978-90-5201-061-8 pb. 
vol. 4 Mahncke, Dieter / Gstöhl, Sieglinde (eds.), Europe's Near Abroad: Promises and Prospects 
of the EU's Neighbourhood Policy, 2008 (316 p.), ISBN 978-90-5201-047-2. 
vol. 3 Mahncke, Dieter / Monar, Jörg (eds.), International Terrorism: A European Response to a 
Global Threat? 2006 (191p.), ISBN 978-90-5201-046-5 / US-ISBN 978-0-8204-6691-0 pb. 
vol. 2 Demaret, Paul / Govaere, Inge / Hanf, Dominik (eds.), European Legal Dynamics - 
Dynamiques juridiques européennes, Revised and updated edition of 30 Years of European Legal 
Studies at the College of Europe, 2005 / 2007 (571 p.), ISBN 978-90-5201-067-0 pb. 
vol. 1 Mahncke, Dieter / Ambos, Alicia / Reynolds, Christopher (eds.), European Foreign Policy: 
From Rhetoric to Reality?, 2004 / second printing 2006 (381 p.), ISBN 978-90-5201-247-6 / US-
ISBN 978-0-8204-6627-9 pb.  
 
If you would like to be added to the mailing list and be informed of new publications and 
department events, please email rina.balbaert@coleurope.eu. Or find us on Facebook: 
www.facebook.com/coepol  
 
